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AND ACCESS TO MEDICINE:




HE purpose of this article is to discuss the issues raised by the
extension of patent protections for pharmaceuticals in recent bilat-
eral trade agreements (BITs) among the United States, Colombia,
and Peru. It will discuss the effects of similar BITs on developing coun-
tries, emphasizing the impact on the Colombian Public Health System.
Special attention is given to compulsory licensing. A compulsory license
is the authorization granted by a government to a third party for the use
of a patent, without the consent of the patent right holder.' The discus-
sion begins with an analysis of the pressure between the patent holders'
rights and the need to provide affordable access to pharmaceuticals, espe-
cially in developing countries. Then it will provide a brief background on
economic integration in the Americas by highlighting the interrelation-
ship of trade interests pursued by the United States and by describing the
Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement (CTPA). Following this back-
ground, the article will focus on compulsory licensing and the exceptions
to patent protection in the CTPA that affect access to medicine. Finally,
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1. Carlos M. Correa, Investment Protection in Bilateral and Free Trade Agreements:
Implications for the Granting of Compulsory Licenses, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 331,
346 (2004).
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the paper will conclude with the possible effects on public health in
Colombia.
Globalization raises important issues in many areas, including access to
health care and medicine. How does economic integration impact human
life? How should wealth be distributed among nations and people?
When the distribution and protection of wealth creates inequalities and
negatively impacts the lives of human beings, the terms and basis for in-
ternational trade must be redefined. When enhanced foreign investment
protection is granted to the detriment of human life and health, it is obvi-
ous that globalization is not fulfilling the basic goal of sustainable devel-
opment. Economic goals can not be pursued at the expense of human
life.
"The emphases on what is to be sustained fall within three major areas:
nature, life support systems, and community. The most common empha-
ses concern life support systems, where the life to be supported first is
human."' 2 People throughout the world should be accorded the very basic
human right to be alive, aided when necessary by accessible medicine and
health care. In this respect, free trade should develop more suitable rules
that favor social goals and give developing countries the opportunity to
have a voice.
While the United States is expressing support for the cause of access to
medicine and the campaign against HIV and other epidemics in the
World Trade Organization (WTO) context,3 it has been promoting and
entering into bilateral agreements with many developing and less-devel-
oped countries that seriously diminish these countries' access to
pharmaceuticals. The Colombian and Peruvian Agreements are two ex-
amples of this practice. 4
In developing its trade policies, the United States has moved away
from using a model based on multilateral trade agreements and moved
towards a model based on BITs. After the Miami WTO Doha Round in
2001 and the freeze of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in
2003, bilateral agreements became the preferred strategy because they
improved the opportunities for the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to
achieve its goals. The United States developed a model for BITs that has
been implemented around the globe in a variety of countries. Examples
2. DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN, & DURWOOD ZOELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 206 (Foundation Press eds., 2d ed. 2002) (emphasis
omitted).
3. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States Welcomes
Negotiations Leading to Positive Outcome on Enhancing Access to Medicines
(Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/PressReleases/2005/De-
cember/UnitedStatesWelcomesNegotiationsLeading-toPositiveOutcome_
onEnhancingAccess toMedicines.html.
4. See Andrea J. Menaker, Benefiting From Experience: Developments in the United
States' Most Recent Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y.
121, 122 (2005).
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include Morocco, 5 Chile,6 and Singapore. 7 The most recent BITs have
been signed with Colombia and Peru. Ratification by the U.S. Congress
is pending.
The model for BITs8 currently being promoted by the USTR extends
intellectual property (IP) rights protection in favor of pharmaceutical
companies by lowering the standards for patent protection, by granting
protection to test data required for the generic industry to obtain permis-
sion to sell medicines, by limiting the grounds on which compulsory li-
censing can be implemented, by granting compensation for delays in
patent application, and by implementing other delays in generic market-
ing approval. These examples of the expansion of IP protection illustrate
an international trade trend, promoted by the United States, which ex-
tends foreign investment protections in favor of developed countries
while negatively impacting cost-effective access to medicines in develop-
ing countries.
In the BITs model, the trading partners seeking agreements with the
United States are often developing countries with economies largely de-
pendent on exports to the United States. The United States is in a much
stronger negotiating position. The use of bilateral treaties with the
United States prevents alliances among the developing countries in any
geographic area, including South America.9 Bilateral treaties are easier
for the United States to negotiate in this context.10 Critics of the bilateral
model argue that this power imbalance divides developing countries and
prevents them from promoting their common interests in the region. The
United States can obtain advantageous provisions that "will maintain or
exacerbate the economic and political differences between the 'devel-
oped' center and the 'developing' periphery."'"
In February 2006, Colombia and the United States completed negotia-
tions for the CTPA. The final version of the CTPA was signed November
25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. 12 Peru signed a similar agreement on De-
5. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/MoroccoFrA/FlnalText/SectionIndex.html.
6. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-
Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html.
7. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agree-
ments/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html.
8. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Summary of U.S. Bilateral Investment
Treaty (BIT) Program (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/
BIT/SummaryfoLUSBilateralInvestmentTreaty_(BIT)_Program.html.
9. Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run
Around the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 15 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 433, 449-454 (2005).
10. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evalua-
tion of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J.
67, 70 (2005).
11. Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind: The Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms
Under the Guise of Economic Integration, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1321, 1330
(2004).
12. Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, as original, http://
www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/FinalText/Sec-
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cember 4, 2006,13 which contains almost identical provisions. When refer-
ring to both agreements, the title Colombian and Peruvian Trade
Promotion Agreements (CPTPAs) will be used. Regarding intellectual
property, the CPTPAs include enhanced protection of patents favoring
the pharmaceutical industry, but raise concerns about access to medicine
and the effective use of compulsory licensing.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PHARMACEUTICALS, AND
ACCESS TO MEDICINES
Pharmaceutical patents grant the rights to manufacture and market
medicines exclusively to the patent holder for a period of twenty years.14
The generic equivalent of any medicine can not be produced or sold until
this period expires. These exclusive rights confer to patent holders the
power of deciding what prices to charge for their drugs. When the ge-
neric industry enters the market, the immediate effect is the reduction of
prices. The longer you prevent generic drugs from being produced, the
longer it takes developing countries to provide them to their citizens.
There is a divergence of interests between those who are creating and
marketing the medicines and the consumers who need them. The inven-
tion of medicines requires intensive research and development (R&D),
while reproduction of them does not involve significant technology or re-
search. This facilitates the production of generic medications since repro-
duction is simple. This situation exacerbated the North-South
confrontation between developed and developing countries because there
is a great need for more low-cost medicines in developing countries.
There are two schools of thought regarding intellectual property pro-
tection for pharmaceuticals. One group believes that social well being
should prevail over private rights.' 5 The second group alleges that if pri-
vate rights are not protected, or if there is excessive social responsibility
imposed, the pharmaceutical industry will exit the market and the incen-
tive to perform the research and development required to produce new
medicines will be weakened. 16 Some have called for disobedience with
respect to the strong protections under the TRIPS, arguing that a neces-
sity defense would preclude State Responsibility and liability. 17
tionIndex.html (For intellectual property provisions, see "16. Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights") [hereinafter CTPA].
13. Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.ustr.gov/frade-
AgreementsBilateral/PeruTPA/FinalTexts/SectionIndex.html.
14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 33, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.81 (1994).
[hereinafter TRIPS].
15. See Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options
Under TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 103, (2003).
16. See Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access to Life-Saving Drugs in the
Developing World, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 211, 252 (2004).
17. James Thuo Gathii, How Necessity may Preclude State Responsibility for Compul-
sory Licensing under the TRIPS Agreement, 31 N.C.J. INT'L L.& COM. REG. 943,
967 (2006).
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Social activists advocate for recognition of human rights in relation to
access to medicines. They push for more governmental involvement to
promote wider access to pharmaceutical technology in order to advance
public health. They allege that access to scientific inventions is tied to the
individual's ability to realize their rights. From a human rights perspec-
tive, the rights of the creator are not absolute but conditional on contri-
bution to the common good and welfare of the society. 18
To support their position they cite examples that show the immense
need for access to medicine. For instance in 2000, 1.7 million died of
tuberculosis and one million died from malaria. 19 Three million died of
AIDS in 2001.20 Ninety-five percent of those infected with HIV live in
developing countries.2 1 Unequal access to treatment is one of the princi-
pal reasons for the lower survival rates in developing nations.
22
Social activists argue that generic drugs are essential in reducing the
price of pharmaceuticals in favor of the poor. Brazil provides a good
example specifically with HIV drugs since it managed to increase access
and reduce costs for pharmaceuticals by domestic manufacture of generic
drugs.23 Brazil and India24 developed a generic industry before entering
into the WTO, and they have opposed extended patent protection for
pharmaceuticals. 25 This situation allowed Brazil to implement these poli-
cies. This partially explains why Brazil refuses to enter into a BIT agree-
ment with the United States and is searching for new possibilities through
Mercado Comtin del Sur (MERCOSUR).2 6
Social activists also claim that higher spending and stronger patent pro-
tection does not necessarily advance research and development (R&D)
efforts.27 Some studies suggest that the pharmaceutical industry does not
invest significantly in R&D,28 and find that only 12.5 percent of the prof-
its are devoted to R&D, while 30.4 percent are invested in marketing.29
Additionally, governments often subsidize pharmaceutical research.
The pharmaceutical industry is also selective when investing in research
according to its profit and market goals. 30 Studies from the World Health
Organization (WHO) concluded that only thirteen out of 1393 drugs
18. Lazzarini, supra note 15, at 118.
19. Id. at 105.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 106.
22. Id. at 105-06.
23. Id. at 129 (stating that in Brazil annual cost fell from U.S. $7,800 per person in
1997 to U.S. $4,137 U.S in 2001).
24. David W Opderbeck, Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58
VAND. L. REV. 501, 521 (2005).
25. For this refusal, India and Brazil were listed in the Section 301 Watch List.
26. Samuel A. Arieti, The Role of MERCOSUR as a Vehicle for Latin American Inte-
gration, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 761,766 (2006).
27. Opderbeck, supra note 24, at 510.
28. NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 9,
11 (Pedro Roffe, Geoff Tansey, & David Vivas-Eugui, eds., Earthscan 2006) [here-
inafter NEGOTIATING HEALTH].
29. See Lazzarini, supra note 15, at 103.
30. Rajkumar, supra note 9, at 439.
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were developed for tropical diseases; ninety percent of investment has
focused on concerns that affect only ten percent of the global
population. 3 1
In their defense, the pharmaceutical industry alleges that they can not
be blamed for all the public health problems in the world. The public
health crisis in developing countries is a result of many factors such as
poverty, malnutrition, lack of prevention, mismanagement, and corrup-
tion.32 The industry maintains that the main issue is one of international
aid. The public health problem requires much broader policies than sim-
ply reducing IP protection. 33 The industry alleges that even countries
that do not grant patent protection and have not become subject to
TRIPS suffer from a public health crisis. 34
The spread of diseases and the rates of mortality in developing and less
developed countries (LDCs) show a need for increased R&D for tropical
diseases. If the WHO is right, why should ninety percent of the people in
the world pay for R&D that only benefits ten per cent? If the argument
is that the pharmaceutical industry is in charge of R&D and developing
countries are sharing the cost of it, then the developing countries should
get some benefit-especially when they are increasing IP protection.
Should R&D be left in the hands of a sector of society motivated by only
economic interests? Mechanisms for participation have to be developed
for interests outside of the pharmaceutical companies. Coordinated ac-
tions from international organizations, non-governmental organizations,
and governments are required to offer R&D to meet the particular needs
of developing and LDCs.
In order to increase the health of the global population, governmental
policies and agreements should be enacted that provide guidance, sup-
port, and financial aid to the pharmaceutical industry when it makes its
R&D decisions. Participation in the definition of medicinal R&D goals
and priorities should be established within the framework of free trade
agreements. International cooperation, including both private and public
action, is required.
The legal requirements of a part of the patent system should be redi-
rected in order to promote specific differential treatment based on the
categorization of the countries and the particular health problems that
they confront. The uniform application of the patent rules for medicines
negatively impacts developing and LDCs without considering the effect
upon human life. 35
Finally, the problem is a question of values and of defining priorities.
Therefore, it is a question of ethics. Does patent protection override the
31. NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 28, at 13.
32. Mercurio, supra note 16, at 249.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 252.
35. Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential
Treatment in WTO Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing
Countries, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 40 (2005).
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potential death of millions? Or should we measure it in social costs? The
economic argument for the protection of intellectual property rights only
makes sense if the welfare gain from the added incentive to innovation is
greater than the reduction of the benefit from competition. 36
III. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAS
The economic integration of the Americas started with the Enterprise
for the Americas Initiative (EAI) in 1990 under the presidency of George
H.W. Bush. EAI promoted negotiations that led to the North America
Free Trade Agreement (NAFHA). 37 Subsequent presidential administra-
tions reaffirmed the United States' dedication to promoting free trade
and economic integration. 38 NAFTA is a successful example of this
policy.
But the FTAA,39 which seeks to integrate the countries of the Western
Hemisphere, has not succeeded. If successful, the FTAA would be con-
sidered the "crown jewel" of free trade agreements because it would cre-
ate the world's largest market. 40 But negotiations were suspended
because of the opposition of Brazil and the southern Cone Common Mar-
ket countries.41 They rejected the U.S. requirements for agricultural sub-
sidies and extended intellectual property protection. Moreover, they felt
that the United States was trying to use its political and economic
strength to impose its terms in the negotiations. 42
The CPTPAs are important because the Andean countries are a vital
target for the expansion of trade and the consolidation of the Western
Hemisphere. The United States has significant economic ties with the
region, and these countries comprise a market for U.S. goods that totaled
$8.3 billion in 2004.4 3 Goods imported from Colombia, Peru, and Ecua-
dor totaled $15.3 billion, and the stock of U.S. foreign investment in these
countries was $7.7 billion in 2004. 44
36. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 398, 399 (Routledge, 2d ed. 1999).
37. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
38. See Scott R. Jablonski, NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute Resolution and Mexico: A
Healthy Mix of International Law, Economics and Politics, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 475, 484 (2004).
39. The Free Trade Area of the Americas is still in the negotiations stage. See gener-
ally http://www.ustr.govfTrade-Agreements/Regional/FTAA/Section-Index.html.
40. Baker, supra note 11, at 1332 (stating that the market will have "850 million con-
sumers buying over $13 trillion in goods and services within only a few years").
41. Southern Cone Common refers to the region composed of Argentina, Chile, Uru-
guay, and Brazil.
42. Baker, supra note 11, at 1331-333 (stating that there is an asymmetry of bargaining
power, i.e., the U.S. economy is ten times larger Brazil's economy and 100 times
larger than the combined total economy of Central America and the Caribbean).
43. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Colom-
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Leftist trends in the region are threatening U.S. interests and are creat-
ing a competing model of economic integration that challenges the ability
and opportunity of the United States to provide leadership and influence
in the process. President Hugo Chavez and his political mentor Fidel
Castro seek the economic independence of Latin America, which has
been heavily reliant on trade with the United States in the past. This
independence could be supported by an alternate trade model called the
Bolivarian Integration.45 Recent leftist trends in Latin America have led
to the success of Evo Morales in Bolivia, 46 Rafael Correa in Ecuador,4 7
and the recent reelection of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.
This leftist wave challenges the economic integration process led by the
United States because Latin American countries would develop their
economies by trading with each other. MERCOSUR offers a new eco-
nomic integration model based upon the philosophies of Argentinean,
Paraguayan, Brazilian, and Venezuelan presidents. Furthermore, Latin
American countries are exploring alliances with Middle Eastern coun-
tries. As of January 2007, MERCOSUR is negotiating a strategic alliance
with the Gulf Cooperation Council. 48 The United States should consider
the rise of leftist trends and offer support to the politically moderate and
conservative countries, such as Chile, Colombia, and Peru.
In Colombia, leftist forces include armed guerillas groups who finance
their activities with illegal drug money. Current President Alvaro Uribe
has vowed to eradicate such groups; to end the kidnapping and killing of
citizens; to stop the destruction of agriculture and forests; and to free
Colombian citizens from the pressures to participate in growing and sell-
ing cocaine.49 Because of his successes in the war against drug and arms
trafficking, he managed to be reelected last year. His success was due in
part to U.S. assistance provided through Plan Colombia. Through Plan
Colombia, the United States provides a variety of resources to help fight
drug trafficking. Unfortunately, this non-binding assistance was not re-
newed, even when Colombia granted most of the concessions the United
States sought in the pending trade promotion agreement. 50 There is a lot
of uncertainty regarding the benefits of the trade promotion agreement
for the Colombian government and population.
45. Bernd D. Weber, Latin America: A survey of Problem Areas, WORLD SECURITY
NETWORK, Aug. 30, 2006, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.
cfm?articleid=13302.
46. Evo Morales assumed office on January 1, 2006.
47. Rafael Correa won the elections in November 2006.
48. For general information concerning the Cooperation Council for the Arab States
of the Gulf, see http://www.gcc-sg.org/Foundations.html.
49. President's Alvaro Uribe, Speech on Assuming the Presidency Pro Tempore of the
Andean Community (CAN) at the Seventeenth Meeting of the Andean Council of
Presidents, http:www.comunidadandina.org/press/speeches/uribel4-6-07.htm.
50. See Bush to ask Congress for Continued Support to Plan Colombia: U.S. Official,
PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Feb. 1, 2007, http://english.people.com.cn/200702/01/
eng20070201_346702.html (stating that the Bush administration would present a
proposal to continue funding Plan Colombia to the U.S. Congress, but noting that
Congress may reject the proposal).
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The USTR office has identified free trade agreements in the region as a
solution for poverty, political instability, and even narco-trafficking.5 1 It
is not clear how trade liberalization may help to achieve social goals.
Given the U.S. economic and political dominance, it is hard for South
American countries to stand their ground in negotiations. But these
countries will be much stronger if they stay united in regional alliances.
Unfortunately, the Andean community is not strong because of the divide
between its members. MERCOSUR seems to be the strongest regional
alliance that may be able to gain some bargaining power because its
members together constitute an important market. But, it is unlikely that
it will enter into negotiations with the Bush administration because
MERCOSUR presidents are more sympathetic to leftist economic
models.
There is a need for balance in both the negotiations of trade agree-
ments and the protection of foreign investment to assure social goals. Ex-
cessive protection once conceded may exacerbate social problems to the
detriment of public health, access to medicine, the environment, and the
parties' governmental regulatory power. The U.S. should not exert its
influence unduly because it could push South American countries farther
to the left, as evidenced by leaders influenced by Castro and Chavez.
A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE ANDEAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
The U.S. Congress enacted the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)
in 1991 in order to promote regional economic development and to pro-
vide economic alternatives to the illegal drug trade.52 ATPA provides
trade benefits to the Andean countries and grants duty-free access to U.S.
markets for approximately 5,600 products. 53 The ATPA was extended
until December 2006 and is now called the Andean Trade Promotion and
Drug Eradication Act (ATPDEA).5 4
In May 2004, the United States initiated free trade agreement negotia-
tions with three Andean nations: Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. 55 The
United States concluded negotiations with Peru in December 2005 and
with Colombia in February 2006.56 Negotiations with Ecuador were sus-
pended in 2006 after the eviction of Occidental Petroleum. 57 Bolivia par-
51. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Notifies Congress
of Intent to Initiate Free Trade Talks with Andean Countries (Nov. 18, 2003), http:/
/www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/ColombiaFTA/PressReleases/Sec-
tionIndex.html.
52. Fact Sheet, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, New Andean Trade Benefits




55. SICE Foreign Trade Information System, Trade Policy Developments, http://
www.sice.oas.org/TPD/ANDUSA/COLUSAe.ASP (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
56. Id.
57. The Center for Public Justice Report at: http://cpjustice.org/stories/storyReader$
1395 (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
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ticipated as an observer and was expected to become a party to the
agreement, but after the presidential elections of Evo Morales and Rafael
Correa, it seems clear that neither Bolivia nor Ecuador is going to join
the agreement in the near future. 58
Recent U.S. elections raise concerns about ratification of the CPTPAs
as they are presently written.59 At least five Senate seats and sixteen
House seats switched from members of Congress who are generally sup-
portive of free-trade agreements to those who express more skepticism. 60
Recently, the U.S. Congress expressed concerns over the following issues:
agricultural trade, intellectual property, access to medicine, and labor
issues. 61
The new negotiations must address these concerns to assure ratification
of an agreement which prevents a dire future for Colombian agriculture
due to the loss of jobs and forced migration of agricultural workers. In-
tellectual property issues and extended patent protection will negatively
impact access to affordable medical care in Colombia and Peru. Violence
directed against labor unions and labor organizers in Colombia continues
to be a serious problem. These human rights violations are well docu-
mented by the U.S. State Department and Human Rights Watch.62
Because the Colombian and the Peruvian treaties are not yet ratified,
on December 9, 2006, the U.S. Congress approved a second extension of
the ATPDEA for six months,63 but it is very unlikely that the Peruvian
Trade Promotion Agreement (PTPA) and the CTPA will be approved by
the expiration of this time period. This would increase duty rates to the
detriment of many Colombian and Peruvian industries. Despite the trea-
ties' final negotiated formats and signatures, some Democratic party
members are seeking the renegotiation of the CPTPAs to include labor
and environmental standards.64
Furthermore, it is possible that the fast-track authority, which expires
in June 2007, will not be renewed. 65 The fast-track authority allows the
President to negotiate trade agreements and then to submit them for ex-
pedited congressional approval.
58. Id.
59. Sanchez, Colombia's Fall from Grace, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 17, 2007, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/NewsSearch?sb=-l&st=Colombia's%
20fall% 20from% 20grace&.
60. Mark Felsenthal, Greenspan Fault Democrats on Trade, WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
Sept. 23, 2007, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/NewsSearch?st=In-
ternational+trade+Congress&fn=&sfn=&sa=ns&cp= &hl=false&sb=-1&sd=&ed&
blt=&x=8&y=8.
61. Sanchez, supra note 59.
62. Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/English/docs/2007/07023/colom16458.
htm, and http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/colombia/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
63. See SICE, Trade Policy and Development, http://www.sice.org/TPD/AND-USA/
COLUSA e.ASP (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
64. See Bilaterals.org, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=9570 (last vis-
ited Sept. 23, 2007).
65. Lauren Etter, Will the New Congress Shift Gears on Free Trade?, WALL ST. J., Nov.
18, 2006, at A7.
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B. THE SPECIFIC U.S. OBJECTIVES OF THE ANDEAN AGREEMENT
The objectives of the Andean Agreement are listed in the letter to the
U.S. Congress stating the intent to initiate free trade talks with the An-
dean countries:
* Seek to establish standards to be applied in the Andean countries
that build on the foundations established in the WTO Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and other
international intellectual property agreements, such as the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, and the Patent Coop-
eration Treaty.
" In areas such as patent protection and protection of undisclosed in-
formation, seek to have the Andean countries apply levels of pro-
tection and practices more in line with U.S. law and practices,
including appropriate flexibility.
* Seek to strengthen the Andean countries' procedures to enforce in-
tellectual property rights, such as ensuring that the Andean coun-
tries' authorities seize suspected pirated and counterfeit goods,
equipment used to make such goods or to transmit pirated goods,
and documentary evidence.
* Seek to strengthen measures in the Andean countries that provide
for compensation of right holders for infringements of intellectual
property rights and to provide for criminal penalties under the An-
dean countries' laws that are sufficient to have a deterrent effect on
piracy and counterfeiting. 66
C. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE COLOMBIAN AND PERUVIAN TRADE
PROMOTION AGREEMENTS
The U.S objectives outlined above were fully achieved. Additionally,
the CPTPAs protect all forms of investment and create a binding interna-
tional arbitration mechanism. The CPTPAs offer market access to the
United States. More than eighty percent of the exports to Colombia will
become duty-free, and the remaining tariffs will be eliminated over a ten
year period.67 The CPTPAs also expand access to service markets, in-
cluding financial services, and forbid non-tariff barriers such as the re-
quirement to hire local professionals. 68
The CPTPAs provide greater protection for IP rights, especially in
trademarks, patents, and test-data for pharmaceuticals. 69 Additionally,
they standardize IP rights consistent with U.S. standards in both protec-
66. Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Representative, to Ted Stevens, U.S.
Senator (Nov. 18, 2003), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Letters-toCon-
gress/2003/AndeanFreeTradeAgreement.html.
67. SICE, http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/AND-USAlNegotiations/US-Colombiacon-
clude.e.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
68. Id.
69. CTPA, supra note 12 Art. 16.9. http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/AND-USA/COL_
USA/Draft text_050806_e/asset-upload file337_9394.pdf.
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tion and enforcement. 70 The protection includes state of the art protec-
tion for digital products.71 It establishes the obligation to keep an
electronic system for the registration and maintenance of trademarks and
criminalizes end-use piracy.72
In compliance with the trend of bilateral agreements, the CPTPAs im-
pose TRIPS-plus conditions, such as provisions for data exclusivity, pat-
ent term extensions, and limitations on the effective use of compulsory
licenses. 73
IV. PATENT PROTECTION UNDER COLOMBIAN AND
PERUVIAN TRADE PROMOTION AGREEMENTS
Colombia and Peru have signed bilateral agreements that include pro-
visions that require higher levels of patent rights than those established
by TRIPS or NAFTA.74 The new CPTPA protection includes: prohibi-
tion of using test data on safety and drug efficacy in order to get govern-
mental approval of generic drugs (elimination of Bolar exception); the
restoration of patent terms to compensate for delays in granting the origi-
nal patent and government authorization for marketing; limitations to the
grounds for revocation of a patent; and limitations to the grounds for
compulsory licenses. 75 It also includes provisions seeking enforcement
and establishing the dispute settlement mechanism.76
A. THE GENERAL OBJECTIVES UNDER THE CTPA
Article 16.1.6 of the CTPA states that the parties "affirm their existing
rights and obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and intellectual prop-
erty agreements concluded or administered under the auspices of the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to which they are
party."'77
The main objective of the TRIPS is to "promote effective and adequate
protection of [IP rights]" under the concept that intellectual property
rights are "private rights" which involve "public policy objectives of na-
tional systems for the protection of intellectual property, including devel-
opmental and technological objectives. ' 78 The TRIPS includes minimum
protection standards and the principles of national treatment and most-
favored nation treatment.79 Members are free to extend the protection,
but in a way that does not contravene the provisions of the CTPA.80
70. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.1.7.
71. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.11.
72. Id.
73. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.9.
74. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.9.
75. Id.
76. CTPA, supra note 12, chapter 21.
77. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.1.6.
78. TRIPS, supra note 14, Preamble.
79. CTPA, supra note 12, art 2.2.
80. TRIPS, supra note 14, arts. 3-4.
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The TRIPS recognizes "the special needs of the least-developed coun-
try [m]embers in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic imple-
mentation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a
sound and viable technological base." 81 Article 7 establishes that the pro-
tection of IP rights "should contribute to the promotion of technological
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance
of rights and obligations. '8 2
TRIPS article 8 adds:
1. Members may in formulating their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their
socio-economic and technological development, provided that
such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with
the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort
to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect
the international transfer of technology.83
These articles provide members the right to issue measures in favor of
public health and nutrition and to prevent abuses by right holders.
In contrast to TRIPS, recent bilateral agreements do not include the
language of general social principles and objectives of intellectual prop-
erty rights. It can be argued that the CTPA did not outline these objec-
tives in order to avoid repetition, and that article 16.1.6 of CTPA, for
instance, provides for the application of TRIPS and other international
treaty provisions that include such social objectives.
Because the CPTPAs contain more extensive protection than the
TRIPS (TRIPS-plus provisions), they could cause disagreements. The
general objectives of TRIPS should not be taken into account in order to
interpret the TRIPS-plus provisions in the CTPA. In other words, the
question is whether these TRIPS-plus provisions, such as data protection
for marketing approval of pharmaceuticals, in the CPTPAs should be in-
terpreted under the general principles and objectives of TRIPS, even if
these TRIPS principles are not included in the new agreement?
Statutory construction varies greatly among systems, and clarity of the
social objectives is very important. The Doha Round was possible be-
cause the movement in developing countries to advance social issues in-
terpreted TRIPS provisions under the social objectives included in it.84
In contrast, a restrictive interpretation would prevent Colombia and Peru
81. Id. General Provisions.
82. Id. art. 7.
83. Id. art 8.
84. See World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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from using the objectives established in TRIPS articles 7 and 8 when at-
tempting to interpret the scope and nature of their obligations in a man-
ner that favors social goals.
B. NATURE AND SCOPE OF PATENT PROTECTION UNDER THE CTPA
The first multilateral treaty that attempted to standardize intellectual
property protection was the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (Paris Convention).8 5 The Paris Convention left the
parties free to establish the criteria of patentability; to decide whether a
patent should or should not be examined in order to determine if the
requirements are met; to decide whether the first applicant or the first
inventor should get the patent; and to decide whether the patents should
be granted for products or processes or both.8 6
The Paris Convention was a flexible agreement that allowed countries
to interpret it in order to achieve their social goals. For instance, several
countries excluded pharmaceutical products as being eligible for patent
protection under the argument that public health prevails over private
and individual rights. Brazil, India, and others implemented restrictions
that excluded patent protection on pharmaceuticals, which enabled them
to develop a generic pharmaceutical industry when other countries could
not do so under subsequent agreements. 87
Under TRIPS, the protection must be available for both products and
processes in almost all fields of technology, providing that the inventions
are "new," involve an "inventive step," and are capable of "industrial
application. '88 TRIPS establishes protection for at least twenty years
"without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technol-
ogy and whether products are imported or locally produced."8 9 The
TRIPS, as opposed to the Paris Convention, includes protection of
pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, which had long been a
controversy. 90
Under the CTPA, the minimum standard of protection will include the
obligations of the parties under the TRIPS Agreement and the obliga-
tions established by the CTPA chapter under Intellectual Property. In
addition, the CTPA includes a long list of treaties that the parties must
adopt or make efforts to adopt, which will probably broaden minimum
standards for protection. This is the list of required treaties:
85. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, originally signed Mar.
20, 1883, revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocswo020.html [hereinafter Paris Conven-
tion]. The original convention of March 20, 1833, may be located at 74 British &
Foreign State Papers 44.
86. NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 29, at 11.
87. Id.
88. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27.
89. Id. arts. 27, 33.
90. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27.
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" By the date of entry: Convention Relating to the Distribution of
Program Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite (1974); Buda-
pest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of
Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure (1977) as
amended in 1980; WIPO copyright treaty (1996); and WIPO Per-
formance and Phonograms Treaty (1996).
* By January 1, 2008: Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970), as
amended in 1979; Trademark Law Treaty (1994); and Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(1991).
* "[M]ake . . .efforts to ratify or accede to": Patent Law Treaty
(2000); Hague Agreement Concerning the International Regis-
tration of Industrial Designs (1999); and Protocol Related to the
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of
Marks (1989).9 1
The Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement reaffirms the TRIPS gen-
eral rule of protection for any invention, whether a product or process, in
all fields of technology. Regarding the requirement of invention, the
CTPA adopts the U.S. definition. 92 The terms "inventive step" and "capa-
ble of industrial application" are deemed to be "synonymous with the
terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful,' respectively. '9 3 "Each party shall pro-
vide that a claimed invention is industrially applicable if it has a specific,
substantial, and credible utility."'94
This definition of invention requirements meets the U.S. standards,
which are broader than both the Andean countries' standards 95 and
TRIPS. This makes it easier to obtain a patent for pharmaceuticals and
grant protection for second uses. The effect is that more pharmaceuticals
will be patentable. Ultimately this will cause an increase in prices.
C. EXCEPTIONs To PATENTABILITY
The TRIPS Agreement enunciates three permissible exceptions to the
basic rules on patentability. 96 Parties may exclude from patentability di-
agnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans
or animals.9 7 Members may exclude plants and animals (other than
micro-organisms) and essential biological processes for the production of
plants or animals (other than non-biological and microbiological
processes). But any country excluding plant varieties from patent protec-
91. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.1.
92. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.1.
93. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.9.1.
94. Id. art. 16.9.11.
95. Normativa Andina, Decision 486: R6gimen Comiin sobre Propiedad Indus-
trial,Gaceta Oficial del Acuerdo de Cartagena, Afio XVI-Nilmero 600, articulos
18-19, Sept. 14, 2000, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/dec/
d486.HTM. [hereinafter Andean Pact, Decisi6n 486] (For English translation,
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties.htm, select "Decision 486.").
96. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27 (2).
97. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 27(3)(a).
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tion must provide an effective sui generis system of protection. 98 Under
TRIPS, parties can exclude inventions contrary "to ordre public or moral-
ity" that include those that are dangerous to life and environment. The
provision also establishes that members may exclude from patentability
those inventions that are critical to the protection of life.99 Some believe
that this exception is an "escape clause" from granting patentability to
many inventions. 10 0
The CTPA allows countries to exclude inventions consistent with
TRIPS article 27(3)(b), but impose the obligation on the parties to under-
take measures that make patent protection available for plants.10 1 As
explained above, plants were excluded in TRIPS. This provision brought
in a controversial issue that could adversely impact agriculture in devel-
oping countries. Additionally, this protection contradicts article 20(c) of
the Andean Pact, which expressly prohibits patents for plants.10 2 The in-
clusion of plant protection may delay market introduction of some bi-
otechnological pharmaceuticals because of high cost, and raises doubts
with respect to environmental effects.
D. TEST DATA PROTECTION
Test data provides governments with information required to evaluate
the risks and effectiveness of new drugs in order to grant the authoriza-
tion to market the product. The information required by governments
may include drug composition, the factoring method, and the effects on
people's health. To accomplish this, a period of scientific testing by the
pharmaceutical industry is required. Consequently, the availability of test
data is important for commercial purposes.
The protection of test data is a very contentious issue and has not been
treated consistently in the agreements. There is the belief that data pro-
tection is a parallel system for patents that developing countries have op-
posed.10 3 This is because there is a discussion about the cost and duration
of testing implementation' 0 4 and disagreement about the patentability of
testing data, as it is not an invention, but rather a commercialization re-
quirement or a trade secret. 10 5 Additionally, there are some practical
concerns regarding the requirement for the generic industry of repeating
the test in order to compete in the market.
The data protection rules contained within TRIPS article 39 state:
98. Id. art. 27(3)(b).
99. Id. art. 27(2).
100. RALPH H. FOLSOM ET AL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: A PROBLEM
ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 894 (American Casebook Series, Thompson West 2006).
101. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.9.2.
102. Andean Pact, Decisi6n 486, supra note 95, art. 20(c).
103. Rajkumar, supra note 9, at 455.
104. Carlos Correa, Protecting Data for Pharmaceutical and Agrochemical Products
Under Free Trade Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 29, at 81, 82-
83.
105. NAFTA, supra note 37, art. 1711.5 (granting protection under a trade secret classi-
fication; as a result, disclosed information is not protected).
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1. In the course of ensuring effective protection against unfair com-
petition as provided in Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention
(1967), Members shall protect undisclosed information in accor-
dance with paragraph 2 and data submitted to governments or
governmental agencies in accordance with paragraph 3.
2. Natural and legal persons shall have the possibility of preventing
information lawfully within their control from being disclosed to,
acquired by, or used by others without their consent in a manner
contrary to honest commercial practices so long as such
information:
a. is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise
configuration and assembly of its components, generally
known among or readily accessible to persons within the cir-
cles that normally deal with the kind of information in
question;
b. has commercial value because it is secret; and
c. has been subject to reasonable steps under the circum-
stances, by the person lawfully in control of the information,
to keep it secret.
3. Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the mar-
keting of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products
which utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undis-
closed test or other data, the origination of which involves a con-
siderable effort, shall protect such data against unfair
commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect such data
against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public
or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected
against unfair commercial use.10 6
Under TRIPS, data protection includes the obligation to grant protec-
tion against "unfair commercial use. '' 10 7 The period of protection for
such data was not established. Parties interpreted the term as unfair in
different ways. For most developing countries, the "use" by the generic
industry of test data to get governmental approval to market the product
was not considered unfair. The interpretation of this term was another
contentious issue. Developed countries interpreted the provision in a
very restrictive way and argued that protection should be granted for five
years. On the other hand, developing countries alleged that test data pro-
tection was under the scope of unfair competition, and parties have the
right to establish what constitutes an "unfair commercial use " consistent
with their social perception. Moreover, they argued that according to
WTO history, such an advantage is not censurable under article 39.108
Therefore, many developing countries legislatively authorized the use
of test data provided by the patent holder in order to grant marketing
106. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 39.
107. Id.
108. Correa, supra note 104, at 85.
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approval to the generic industry.' 0 9 Recent BITs, 110 including the
CPTPAs, solve the problem by granting protection to test data for a new
pharmaceutical for five years and for a new agricultural chemical product
for ten years.111
In exchange for the first renewal of the ATPA, Colombia enacted a
regulation that confers data protection for new entities for five years. 112
The decree has been highly criticized and many opposed the inclusion of
data protection in the CTPA that make the measure permanent. Unlike
TRIPS, the CTPA does not require data to be "undisclosed." '1 3 There-
fore, the protection is granted even to publicly available data.1 14 This
protection is conferred even beyond the period of patent protection.
Moreover, the five-year period may be extended because the same pro-
tection is granted when a person previously submitted the safety or effi-
cacy information to obtain marketing approval in another territory.1 15 In
this case, "a Party may require that the person providing the information
in the other territory seek approval in the territory of the Party within
five years after obtaining marketing approval in the other territory."'116
Consequently, the generic industry can not get marketing approval for
a pharmaceutical by using the test data provided by the patent holder nor
by using the evidence of the marketing approval for bioequivalent drugs.
The negative consequences of this provision are predictable: the generic
pharmaceutical industry will not get into the market until the data protec-
tion period has expired. This is because reproduction of the tests is ex-
pensive, demanding time and technology that the generic industry can not
afford. Therefore, as a practical matter, patent protection was extended
at a minimum for another five years.
In Colombia, the protection of test data has already been challenged
under the Decree 2085 issued in 2002.117 The validity of the decree was
challenged before the tribunal of the Andean Pact.118 Initially they de-
cided that such measures violated article 266 of Decision 486, which pre-
vents countries from taking measures or granting exclusive rights that
109. Thomas K. Mirabile, Aids, Africa and Access to Medicines, 11 MSU-DCL J. INT'L
L. 175, 208 (2002).
110. U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, supra note 5; U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agree-
ment, supra note 6; U.S.-Sing. Free Trade Agreement, supra note 7.
111. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.10(a).
112. Decreto No. 2085, de 16 de Septiembre de 2002, D.O. de 19.09.2002 (Colom.),
http://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa-new/decretoslinea/2002/septiembre/19/dec20
85190902.doc.
113. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16(9)(5).
114. Unlike the other BITs, the CPTPAs grant protection even to disclosed
information.
115. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16(9)(6).
116. CTPA, supra note 12, art 16.10(b).
117. Decreto No. 2085, de 16 de Septiembre de 2002, D.O. de 19.09.2002.
118. Carlos M. Correa, UNCTAD/ICTSD, Dialogo Regional Sobre Propiedad Intelec-
tual, Innovacion y Desarrollo Sostenible, http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2006-05-10/
Docs/correa.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
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may be in conflict with fundamental rights such as health and life. 119
With regard to the issue of Decree 2085, the institution in charge imple-
mented a policy according to which data exclusive period was not applica-
ble if the applicant filed bioequivalence studies.' 20 This resulted in the
United States listing Colombia on a Section 301 Watch List. 121 Later, in
April 2006, the Andean Pact issued a Decision (with the votes of Colom-
bia, Peru, and Ecuador) that authorizes members to grant data protection
in order to avoid future conflicts and to ease negotiations of the
CPTPAs. 122
Data protection greatly limits the right of governments to issue com-
pulsory licenses because even if a patent is granted to the generic indus-
try, it won't be able to use the medical test data required for marketing
the product without the authorization and payment to the patent holder.
It is very unlikely that the generic industry will reproduce the expensive
studies required to obtain such data.
In summary, test data protection in the new bilateral models, including
the CPTPAs, became a new intellectual property right. It shifted from a
mere trade secret to a separate right akin to a patent with a minimum
protection of five years. It also shifted from a protection of undisclosed
test information to a protection for even publicly available information.
The impact has been to prevent generic pharmaceutical manufacturers
from entering the market, thus preventing people in developing countries
from receiving life saving medicines. No credible justification for such
protection has been offered. The research and development costs have
already been recovered by the patent holders, having been included in
the price of the medications for over twenty years.
E. THE ELIMINATION OF THE BOLAR ExCEPTrION
The Bolar exception allows generic industries a period for pre-market-
ing tests which is required to prepare the application for regulatory ap-
proval. 123 The test may be completed before the expiration of the
patent.124 Although there is no specific provision relating to this excep-
tion, some countries including Colombia have implemented the Bolar ex-
ception under the flexibilities of TRIPS. 125
119. Carlos M. Correa, Proteccion de Productos Farmacduticos y Agroquimicos
('Productos Regulados') en DR-CAFTA, INT'L CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINA-
BLE DEV. [ICSTD] (2006) http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2006-05-10/Docs/correa.pdf.
120. Correa, supra note 118, n.7.
121. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, 301 WATCH LIST REPORT 158 (2003), http://
www.cptech.org/ip/health/phrma/301-03/2003-PhRMA-301.pdf.
122. Correa, supra note 118.
123. Miguel Ernesto Cortes Gamga, Intellectual Property on FTA, Impacs on Pharma-
ceutical Spending and Access to Medicines in Colombia, http://www.ftamalaysia.
org/filedir/118329843045f5120dcc995.doc (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
124. Id. at 34.
125. See Carlos M. Correa, Health and Intellectual Property Rights, 79 WORLD HEALTH
ORG. BULL. 381 (2001), http://whqlibdoc.who.int/bulletin/2001/issue5/79(5)edito-
rial.pdf.
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Because of the new data protection granted in the CPTPAs, the generic
industry will not be able to take advantage of the Bolar exception any-
more. Governments will not be able to grant market authorization
before the expiration of the patent or the expiration of data protection in
their territory or in the territory of the other party. The consequence will
be an extension of the period of protection granted in TRIPS equivalent
to the time that the government takes to issue the market authorization.
F. RESTORATION OF THE PERIOD OF PROTECTION FOR DELAYS
In addition to the extended period added by the elimination of Bolar
exception and the granting of data protection, the CTPA grants to the
patent holder the right to extend the patent term to compensate for de-
lays in both the examination of the patent application and in the process
of marketing approval. 126 These extensions are new; they were not in-
cluded in TRIPS. 127 The obvious consequence is a delay in the entry of
generic medications into the market.
G. COMPULSORY LICENSING
A compulsory license is the authorization granted by a government to a
third party for the use of a patent when certain conditions are met. The
nature of these requirements changed dramatically from the Paris Con-
vention to the Doha Round, and after the amendment to the TRIPS arti-
cle 31 discussed below.
1. Compulsory Licensing under the Paris Convention
The first multilateral treaty that attempted to standardize intellectual
property protection was the Paris Convention. The Paris Convention
granted protection to patent holders, but at the same time imposed the
obligation of "working the patent," which is understood as: "the patentee
shall remain under the obligation to exploit his patent in accordance with
the laws of the country into which he introduces the patent."' 2 8
In the 1967 Stockholm Revision to the Paris Convention, article
5(A)(2) was altered: "Each country has the right to take legislative mea-
sures providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses
which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by
the patent, for example, failure to work. ' 129
The failure to work the patent was considered an abuse capable of trig-
gering government use or compulsory licensing. This concept was
founded on the belief that IP protection is justified due to the transfer of
technology.
126. CTPA, supra note 12, arts. 16(9), (6)(b).
127. CTPA, supra note 12, art. 16.9.6.
128. Paris Convention as originally in 1883, supra note 85, art. 5(2), as quoted in RALPH
H. FOLSOM ET AL, NAFTA: A PROBLEM ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 398 (West
Group 2000).
129. Paris Convention as revised in 1967, supra note 128.
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Consequently, compulsory licensing was a remedy for a patent holder's
abuses. The interpretation of the term "failure to work" was determined
by the country of issuance. Most countries believed that importation of
the product to the issuing country would not fulfill the requirement of
"working the patent." In other words, importation of the product was
considered an abuse of the patent holder's rights that could trigger com-
pulsory licenses.
Ralph Folsom provides an explanation of this matter by quoting the
Director of the United International Bureau for the Protection of Inter-
national Property at the time of the 1967 revision, George Bodenhausen:
"The member states are also free to define what they understand by 'fail-
ure to work'. Normally, working a patent will be understood to mean
working it industrially, namely, by manufacture of the patented product,
or industrial application of a patented process. Thus importation or sale
of the patented article, or the article manufactured by a patented process,
will not normally be regarded as 'working the patent."' 130
Under the "working the patent" interpretation, Brazil developed a ge-
neric industry and granted licenses for eight to the twelve AIDS medica-
tions during the period preceding 1994, when it joined the WTO.13 1
2. Compulsory Licensing Concerning TRIPS
In 1988, the United States issued the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act.132 This act led to the Uruguay Round of negotiations and the
TRIPS Agreement. The "Special 301" allows the USTR to "promote"
intellectual property protection favorable to the United States and other
developed countries by threatening trading partners with retaliatory mea-
sures if they do not accomplish specific standards of intellectual property
rights protection.1 33
Many countries opted to increase intellectual property protection
under pressure from the USTR in 1989.134 Some agreements increased
protection for pharmaceuticals, such as those signed with Chile and Indo-
nesia. 135 Brazil began granting patents for pharmaceuticals in 1997 under
the same threat. 13 6 The WTO negotiations culminated in the 1994 Agree-
ment which embraced most of the goals of developed countries. 137
Developing countries were not successful in promoting social and pub-
lic interests, including flexibilities that would allow compulsory licens-
130. FOLSOM, supra note 128, at 398.
131. Lazzarini, supra note 15, at 129.
132. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (2001); see also
19 U.S.C. § 2171 (addressing functions of the Office of the United States Trade
Representative).
133. FOLSOM, supra note 100, at 889.
134. Id. at 890.
135. Chile-United States, Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 17, http://www.sice.oas.org/
Trade/chiusa e/chiusaind-e.asp (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
136. FOLSOM, supra note 100, at 889.
137. TRIPS, supra note 14. at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/t-agmO-e.
htm.
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ing.138 The grounds on which compulsory licenses may be granted are
contained in article 31 of the TRIPS. 139 The rule proved to be inefficient
in meeting the needs of developing countries. TRIPS changed the basis
from which compulsory licenses can be granted, as it provides a more
restrictive interpretation of the term "failure to work." As explained
above, importation is not considered an abuse; as a consequence, compul-
sory licensing is no longer a remedy, but rather an exceptional measure
that governments may use to confront health crisis or emergencies.
Importation is not desirable for developing countries, which granted IP
rights concessions in order to obtain transfer of technology and the ability
to manufacture the medications. Importation results in higher prices,
limiting access to medicine for the poor. Unfortunately, compulsory li-
censing in TRIPS does not serve to guarantee the transfer of technol-
ogy, 140 Under TRIPS, compulsory licensing is considered an exception to
the exclusive rights granted to patent holders to exploit their inventions.
Under certain conditions, such as public health needs or lack of use, gov-
ernments can exploit the patent by themselves (government use) or they
can grant the use of the patent to others-third parties or industries-in
order to guarantee public goals, such as access to medicines for citizens
(compulsory licensing). 141 The use is permitted even without prior nego-
tiation in the event of a national emergency. The requirements for grant-
ing compulsory licenses and their extension and scope are very
controversial and have been thoroughly discussed within the framework
of the North-South confrontation and the WTO rounds.
The TRIPS agreement authorized compulsory licensing in article 31
and stated some conditions that can be summarized as follows:
* Members seeking to use compulsory licensing have to include in
their laws a provision allowing such use.
* The government must intend to obtain the authorization from the
right holder or have failed in its attempt.
" The use of a compulsory license shall be considered on its individ-
ual merits; it is limited to the purpose for which it was authorized;
and can not be exclusive or transferable independently from the
authorized holder.
" The scope and duration of compulsory licensing shall be limited.
* Notification is required but can be waived in case of a national
emergency.
* The right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration, taking into
account the economic value of the authorization.
* Authorization for such use and remuneration must be liable.
" Judicial review shall be granted for the validity of the decision
relating to the authorization and the remuneration.
138. SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 109 (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
139. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31.
140. FOLSOM, supra note 100, at 397.
141. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31.
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* The use of the patent "shall be authorized predominantly for the
supply of the domestic market."' 142
The last requirement was the most problematic for developing coun-
tries, especially African countries that wanted to use compulsory licenses
in the pharmaceutical industry. The main obstacle was that most of the
countries in need of certain medicines to confront health crises such as
HIV/AIDS, lack the technology to produce the medicine or have very
small populations to develop such an industry. This problem was solved
in the amendment to TRIPS in December 2005 that waives the condition
of domestic use.1 43
Prior to issuance of a compulsory license, governments must make ef-
forts to get authorization from the patent holder in "reasonable commer-
cial terms" and pay "adequate remuneration. '" 144 To allow effective use
of the measure, these terms should be interpreted in light of the social
and economic interests stated in the objectives of the agreement. 145
3. The Doha Round and the Amendments to TRIPS
Intense negotiations during the Doha Round led to the Ministerial
Declaration of 11/14/2001 (Doha Declaration) 146 and the subsequent
amendment of article 31 on December 17, 2005 (TRIPS Amendment).
The TRIPS Amendment includes the flexibility required for developing
countries to use this measure effectively. 147
Some developing countries made use of the flexibilities under TRIPS
and issued laws that allowed government to revoke patents, accept paral-
lel imports, and ease the conditions for compulsory licenses. These ac-
tions triggered opposition from developed countries. Brazil and India
were two countries listed in the Section 301 Watch List and threatened
with sanctions.1 48 The resistance from developed countries pushed devel-
oping countries and activist groups to oppose the monopoly granted to
pharmaceuticals for essential medicines. Medicines for the treatment of
AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis created most of the controversy.1 49
In September 2001, the U.S. position regarding compulsory licensing
became untenable, due to the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the
subsequent anthrax scares. The U.S. government threatened the issuance
of compulsory licenses. Other countries noticed the inconsistencies of the
U.S. position.150 On November 14, 2001, the Doha Declaration was
142. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31(f).
143. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 6 December 2005, WT/L/641
(2005), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/wt1641_e.htm
[hereinafter TRIPS Amendment].
144. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31(b).
145. TREBILCOCK, supra note 36, at 414.
146. Doha Declaration, supra note 84, See negotiation history at: http://www.wto.org/
English/tratop-e/dda-e/ddae.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
147. TRIPS Amendment, supra note 144, General Considerations.
148. NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 29, at 17.
149. SELL, supra note 138, at 148.
150. Mercurio, supra note 16, at 224-225 nn.50-51.
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adopted; it stated that TRIPS should be interpreted in a manner support-
ive of public health. 151
The Doha Declaration affirms the right of members to determine the
grounds upon which compulsory licenses are granted and to define what
constitutes a national emergency. 152 The Doha Declaration also ad-
dresses the problem of accessibility to medicines in two ways. First, it
provides a framework for IP rights that recognizes the goals of public
health, access to medicine, and R&D. Second, it provides a flexible inter-
pretation of compulsory licensing that grants parties the discretion to de-
termine the circumstances that could trigger the use of compulsory
licensing. 153
Paragraph 5 contains the most controversial provisions of the Doha
Declaration. It establishes the objectives of the Agreement, highlights
the interpretation of its provisions, and it reaffirms freedom to grant com-
pulsory licenses. Additionally, paragraph 5 reaffirms the freedom to es-
tablish its own regime for exhaustion of IP rights. 154 Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration reaffirms the objectives of sustainable development;
protection of human, animal, and plant life, and addresses the environ-
ment as well as international cooperation. To meet these objectives, par-
ties must be mutually supportive. Countries are allowed to take the
measures they consider appropriate in order to protect human, animal,
and plant life or health, as long as those measures are not discriminatory
or arbitrary. 55
The Doha Round represented the first time international health and
development was discussed at the WTO level.' 56 It "is viewed as the first
significant victory for developing countries in the short history of
TRIPS."'1 57 But the Doha Round failed to provide a solution for coun-
tries with insufficient or no manufacturing capability in the pharmaceuti-
cal sector. These countries were limited by article 31(f), which
conditioned the use of compulsory licensing "predominantly for the sup-
ply of the domestic market.' 58
In order to solve the problem, the Decision of the WTO General
Council (the 2003 Decision) promulgated on August 30, 2003 waived the
requirement under article 31(f).159 This decision established some formal
requirements primarily related to notification, publication, and trans-





156. Kevin J. Nowak, Staying within the Negotiated Framework: Abiding by the Non-
discrimination Clause in TRIPS Article 27, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 899, 913 (2005).
157. Mercurio, supra note 16, at 212.
158. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 31(f).
159. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of the General Council of 30 Au-
gust 2003, WT/L/540 and Corr.1 (2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop.e/trips-e/implem-para6_e.htm [hereinafter 2003 Decision].
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parency. 160 The notifications to the Council for TRIPS are established
for both the eligible importing member and the exporting member. 1
61
These notifications will contain information regarding the quantities of
the products, the insufficient manufacturing capacity of the importing
member, and the intention to grant compulsory licenses. 162 The export-
ing member shall pledge that the compulsory licenses for exportation will
be used only in the degree necessary to meet the needs of the importing
country. 163 The product's identification will be accomplished with spe-
cific labeling, special packaging, and special coloring etc., in order to pre-
vent parallel importation. 164 In addition, the 2003 Decision established
the obligation of the importing member to prevent re-exportation for all
members and to prevent importation of the products that violate the pur-
poses and scope of the compulsory license. 165 Finally, the 2003 Decision
calls for cooperation between the members and its own implementation,
under certain conditions of the 31(f)'s waiver provision in the regional
agreements. 166
4. The TRIPS Amendment of December 6, 2005
The TRIPS Amendment 167 closely follows the 2003 Decision. It waives
the requirement for use of a compulsory license to supply the domestic
market and provides that the remuneration to the patent holder takes
into account the economic value "to the importing country.' 168 It reaf-
firmed the interpretation of the Doha Round and the flexibility of coun-
tries to achieve measures in support of public health goals.169
Notifications from importing and exporting members must be accom-
plished, but they do not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to
use the system.170 Also, information regarding the compulsory license
must be posted on a website. 17 '
The Decision of 2005 shall be open for acceptance by members until
December 1, 2007, or such later date as may be decided by the Ministerial
Conference. 72 Currently, only seven members of the 150, representing







166. See Duncan Mathews, From the August 30, 2003 WTO Decision to the December 6,
2005 Agreement on an Amendments to TRIPS: Improving Access to Medicines in
Developing Countries, 2 INTELL. .PROP.Q. 91, 99 (2006).
167. TRIPS Amendment, supra note 144.
168. Id. art. 3lbis(2).
169. Id. General Statement or Motivations.
170. Id. at n.8.
171. Mathews, supra note 176, at 99.
172. World Trade Organization, Countries Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/amendmente.htm (last
visited Sept. 8, 2007).
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United States on December 17, 2005; Switzerland on September 13, 2006;
El Salvador on September 19, 2006; Republic of Korea on January 24,
2007; Norway on February 5, 2007; India on March 26, 2007; and the Phil-
ippines on March 30, 2007.173
5. The Difficulties in the Application of Compulsory Licensing under
TRIPS
Listed below are some difficulties that can be foreseen in future imple-
mentation of compulsory licenses:
1. The procedures required compound actions from both the im-
porting and the exporting countries that may delay and serve as
a barrier by reducing the effectiveness of the measure. 174
2. The scope of the measure may be an issue. The provision pro-
vides few guidelines. For instance, could diseases such as cancer
or hepatitis trigger a compulsory license?t 75
3. Article 31 waives the "domestic use" requirement when the im-
porting country lacks the capability to produce the drug. But
what are the guidelines to define such insufficiency? It seems
that the criterion is left to the country seeking to apply the
measure.
176
4. Paragraph 3 states that adequate remuneration "shall be paid ...
taking into account the economic value to the importing Mem-
ber of the use that has been authorized in the exporting Mem-
ber."' 177 The meaning of "adequate remuneration" is ambiguous.
Developing countries will insist that payment should be very low.
But pharmaceutical companies will seek adequate compensation
to cover the costs of R&D and provisions for a profit.
5. Parallel Importation: It is clear under TRIPS that re-exportation
is forbidden, but the scope and extension of the importing coun-
try's responsibility to prevent the re-exportation are not defined.
Exhaustion was not clearly ruled on and developing countries
interpreted that they were allowed to resell the imported prod-
ucts as mentioned above. 178
6. In addition to the former limitation, TRIPS prohibits countries
from seeking the use of compulsory licenses to grant exclusive
licenses. Exclusive licenses authorize third parties to use the in-
vention to the exclusion of the patent holder. Exclusive licenses
were used by some countries to push patent holders to work the
patent and they were an efficient bargaining tool.179
173. World Trade Organization, Countries Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS
Agreement, http://www.wto.org/englishtratope/trips-e/amendment-e.htm (last
visited Sept. 8, 2007).
174. TRIPS Amendment, supra note 144, Annex to the TRIPS Agreement 1(b).
175. Id. art. 31bis.
176. Id. art. 3lbis(l).
177. Id. Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, art. 3Ibis(2).
178. See Richard Wilder, Workshop on Differential Pricing and Financing of Essential
Drugs, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/hosbjor-presentations_e/28wil-
dere.doc (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
179. SELL, supra note 138, at 115-116.
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6. The New Limitation of Compulsory Licensing Under CPTA
In addition to the limitations mentioned above, test data protection is
seriously limiting the scope and use of compulsory licenses in Colombia
and Peru. Under the CPTA, the generic industry will have to ask the
patent holder for additional authorization in order to use the data or wait
until the expiration of the data protection period. This is because it is not
likely that the generic industry will repeat the studies required to obtain
the market authorization. This is a new economic burden imposed upon
the generic industry.
Barriers to its participation in the market are against stated U.S. com-
mitments to public health and access to medicine. As expressed by for-
mer U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick:
Striking the right balance between addressing the needs of the
poorest countries while ensuring intellectual property protections
that foster the future development of lifesaving drugs had eluded us.
The United States, working with other WTO members and our phar-
maceutical industry, has strived to bridge the many differences and
sought to develop with others constructive ideas about how to move
forward. I'm very pleased that today we've been able to strike this
balance. The consensus now reached in the WTO is a big step for-
ward, removing a major hurdle to a successful Ministerial in Cancun
and the overall Doha negotiations.' 8 0
V. THE IMPACT OF THE NEW PROVISIONS IN THE CPTPAS
The restrictions described above will delay the entry of generics into
the market to compete with the patent holder. This will significantly im-
pact access to medicine because of the enormous price differences, as il-
lustrated in the table below:






*Market prices weighted average, 2003.181
180. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of U.S. Trade
Representative Robert B. Zoellick on TRIPS and Access to Medicines (Aug. 30,
2003), http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/PressReleases/2003/August/State-
ment of US Trade RepresentativeRobert B Zoellick on TRIPSaccess to_
medicines.html?ht=.
181. Mirta Levis, Role, Perspectives and Challenges of the Generic Pharmaceutical In-
dustry in Latin America, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 28, at 5611.
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Government attempts to market generics is greatly hindered by the
protection granted in the CPTPAs. This contradicts the Doha Declara-
tion and the following TRIPS Amendment of December 6, 2005.
In April 2005, the Colombian National University Center of Scientific
Research released a study on the possible impact of the CTPA on public
health in the capital district of Bogota. 182 The conclusions are alarming:
" The average difference in prices between a generic medicine and a
product under patent protection is 67.3 percent. The prices will de-
crease 20 percent when the monopoly expires and 48 percent when
various competitors enter the market.
" The impact of these provisions on Bogota's health, described above, is
summarized in the chart bellow:
YEAR 2005 2010 2030 2040 2050
Pharmaceutical expen- $7,551,043 $31,650,929 $208,231,593 $280,934,530 $379,021301
diture under TRIPS
Impact for two years $3,742,691 $19,448,161 $79,128,006 $106,755,122 $144,028,096
of compensation
Impact for data protec- $3,742,691 $27,456,227 $62,469,478 $84,280,359 $113.706,392
tion for 5 years
Impact for extended
smce fo ptenbiy $3,742,691 $27,456,227 $145,762,115 $196,654,171 $256,314,914scope of patentability
Impact for Data pro-
tection+compensation+ $3,742,691 $31,803,463 $316,512,022 $427,020,486 $576.112,384
extended patentability
*The figures are in U.S. dollars and represent total market.
*The expenditure per capita is calculated at $29 U.S. for 2 005 .183
Some conclusions of the study are:
" The compensation for two years delay in the patent office will
cost U.S. $79 million, in 2030. This is equivalent to the expendi-
ture required to provide pharmaceuticals for 1.8 million
people.184
" The data protection will cost U.S. $62 million, in 2030 which is
equivalent to the expenditure required to provide pharmaceuti-
cals for 1.4 million people.
* The relaxation of the criteria for patentability (second-use) will
cost U.S. $146 million U.S. in 2030, the equivalent to the expendi-
ture required to provide pharmaceuticals for 3.5 million people.
" The effect of the combined provisions will impose a cost of
$317,000,000 U.S., equivalent to the expenditure required to pro-
vide medicine to 76 percent of the Bogota's population.
182. National University Centre for Research and Development, Bogota Colombia,
Impactos del Tratado de Libre Comercio Colombia-Estados Unidos en el Sector
Salud del Distrito Capital. [The impact of the Colombian and United States Free
Trade Agreement on Public Health in the Capital District] 1 (Apr. 19, 2005), http://
www.bogota.gov.co/galeria/saludytlcenbogota.pdf.
183. Id. at 18.
184. Id. at 35.
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0 In 2030, the people of Bogota are going to expend 30.69 percent
more on medicines than in 2005.185
The same study concludes that job losses in pharmaceutical industry
will oscillate 13 percent to 100 percent during the period 2005-2050.186
The Colombian Government has argued that the CPTPA will provide
for transference of technology, but the treaty's terms don't provide for it.
On the contrary, social goals are not clearly established and there are no
conditions or requirements for the transfer of technology.
Although the parties have signed a letter of understanding clarifying
that "[c]hapter [slixteen does not prevent the effective utilization of the
TRIPS/health solution," the letter contains abstract language, and it does
not waive the provisions regarding test data protection or the limitations
described above.187 Moreover, the binding effect of a letter of under-
standing is questionable.
Consequently, the Colombian and Peruvian Trade Promotion Agree-
ments are a departure from the social balance and flexibilities that were
achieved in the Doha Round by developing countries, and will negatively
impact the health of Colombians and Peruvians.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The degree to which international protection of IP rights favors devel-
oped countries has increased from the Paris Convention to the recent
bilateral treaties negotiated by the United States. There is a clear trend
to expand the scope of intellectual property rights, relax patentability cri-
teria, and include inventions that were or are not patentable in many
countries, such as pharmaceuticals and plant varieties. This expansion
has created new categories of intellectual property protections such as
test data protection for pharmaceuticals and agricultural products. It has
changed the nature of compulsory licensing from a remedy for the failure
to use a patent to a rare, exceptional measure applicable to confront only
public crisis.
The United States has developed trade mechanisms to pressure devel-
oping and LDCs to make concessions towards increasing intellectual
property rights, to their own detriment. One of these mechanisms is sec-
tion 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, known as the Section 301 Watch List,
which targets countries that do not implement U.S trade policies. Finan-
cial aid such as the ATPDEA has also been used to pressure Colombia to
grant expanded protections to U.S. industries and interests.
During the Doha Round, developing and LDCs reacted against exces-
sive intellectual property protections granted in TRIPS because these
provisions prevented them from taking measures on behalf of public wel-
185. Id. at 36-37.
186. Id. at 115.
187. CTPA, Public Health Understanding letter on health issues (original document),
http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/ANDUSA/COLUSA/Draft-text050806_e/asset_
uploadjfilel29_9403.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
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fare. The Doha Round was an important advance regarding public health
and access to medicine. Developing and LDCs interpreted the treaty in a
broad way, utilizing the flexibilities that were included in the text of the
Agreement. These interpretations favored social goals and led to the
amendment of TRIPS article 31, which authorized the use of compulsory
licensing to confront public health crises.
After the Doha Round, the United States implemented a new eco-
nomic integration strategy based on bilateral rather than multilateral ne-
gotiations and agreements. Bilateral treaties are easier to negotiate in
favor of U.S. interests, and are characterized by an imbalance in the bar-
gaining power between the parties. Developing and LDCs have con-
ceded excessive intellectual property protections in favor of U.S.
industries. These setbacks will increase the gap between the richest coun-
tries and the poorest.
Excessive protection of intellectual property rights has negatively im-
pacted social goals in developing and LDCs. The pharmaceutical indus-
try claims to need patent extensions to do the research required to create
new medicines. Unfortunately, the industry is profit-oriented, and there-
fore its efforts are not focused on the medicines required to confront pub-
lic crisis in poor countries. International cooperation and joint actions
between private and public sectors are essential to address the health
needs in developing and LDCs.
Medications and agricultural products are essential to fulfill basic
human needs. Differential treatment should be applicable to patent pro-
tection for pharmaceuticals in order to effectively improve health in de-
veloping and LDCs. Compulsory licensing and other social mechanisms
should be available to adequately balance the needs of patent holders and
the need for the protection of human life.
Intellectual property and patent protection have been used to gain eco-
nomic power in favor of trade by multinational corporations. The United
States has been aggressively defending these interests. MERCOSUR and
the new leftist trend in Latin America are competing with the U.S. trade
model. The United States should consider the impact of its trade policy
in the region in order to prevent Latin American countries from joining
the Bolivarian Trade Model led by President Hugo Chavez.
The Colombian and Peruvian Trade Promotion Agreements are just
two examples of recent agreements signed by the United States that fol-
low the trend of increasing intellectual property protection, especially
patent protection. Under these agreements parties are obliged to under-
take measures that make patent protection available for plants, some-
thing which developing and LDCs have refused to concede in the past.
Additionally, the agreements evidence a relaxation of patent standards,
which in turn expands the scope of patentability-allowing second-use
patents for pharmaceuticals. The CPTPAs include test data protection
for five years even after expiration of patents, eliminate the Bolar excep-
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tion, and create compensation for delays in the patent process and mar-
keting approval.
The effect of these TRIPS-plus provisions is that the generic pharma-
ceutical industry will not be able to enter into the market once the initial
patent protection period of twenty years has expired. The lack of compe-
tition will maintain higher prices for medicine, to the detriment of public
health, and prevent access to medicine in developing countries.
Even more importantly, the new provisions seriously compromise and
limit the use of compulsory licenses. Medical test data protection makes
compulsory licensing impractical, and the generic industry is not likely to
repeat the tests required for governmental approval. In addition, test
data protection rules out the Bolar exception, which is arguably allowed
under TRIPS.
The CPTPAs are in fact a retreat from the achievements of developing
countries in Doha Round. The agreements clearly contradict the pur-
ported U.S. commitments to public health and access to medicine.
The stated reasons for granting the Colombian and Peruvian expan-
sions of patent protection are based on trade incentives. Even if some
sectors of the economy will benefit from these agreements, other indus-
tries, health care, and access to medicine will suffer. For instance, it has
been estimated that the implementation of the treaty will prevent more
than 70 percent of the people in Bogota's public health care system from
having access to medicine in 2030.
The newly elected U.S. Congress has not ratified, but instead has ques-
tioned the terms of the Colombian and Peruvian Agreements. This new
Congress may require further renegotiation of its provisions in order to
grant their approval. This could be an opportunity to rewrite the
CPTPAs, so they favor public health and access to medicine. Or it may
result in even harsher effects on the health of the Colombian people.
This is also an opportunity to highlight the U.S. change from using multi-
lateral trade agreements to imposing unfair terms through the use of bi-
lateral trade agreements.
VII. AUTHOR'S ADDENDUM
Many changes have taken place since this article was written in Decem-
ber, 2006. Due to the new formation of the United State Congress after
the elections in November, 2006, strong opposition to the Agreement was
raised. The opposition is led by some Democrats who oppose its ap-
proval. 188 The main concerns were how to address labor, environmental,
and access to pharmaceuticals issues.189 Additionally, to protect human
rights. On May 10, 2007, The United States Trade Representative and
188. Marcela Sanchez, Colombia's Fall From Grace, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 17,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/17/
AR2007081700763.htm.
189. International Herald Tribune, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/llfbusiness/
NA-FIN-ECO-US-Trade-Congress.php (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
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Congressional trade leaders reached an agreement to secure support for
Congressional approval of pending trade agreements.
After the Colombian Congress had signed the initial text of the Agree-
ment, the Colombian government agreed to initiate a new round of nego-
tiations to modify the text, in order to assure United States Congressional
approval. On 28 June 2007, the United States and Colombia reached an
agreement to amend the initial text of the Colombian Trade Promotion
Agreement, 190 even before it was ratified. On the 4 of July Colombian
President Uribe approved the Agreement and the government submitted
the modifications to the Congress. 191 Last August, Colombian Congress
approved the modifications. In spite of this, the resistance to approval of
the agreement in the United States Congress does not seem to have
diminished. 192
The main modifications related with the subject matter of this article
are the following:
1. Pharmaceutical products were excluded in the compensation de-
lays. The new text only binds the parties to concede that com-
pensation for patents different from pharmaceuticals.
Additionally, the compensation for delays in the marketing ap-
proval is not mandatory, so the Colombian government will have
freedom to establish such compensation. 193
2. Doha flexibilities were incorporated into the text of the agree-
ment rather than being contained in a letter of understanding.
This reaffirms the parties ability to import pharmaceuticals in or-
der to confront a health crisis in the Country.194 This change
makes the CTPA more suitable with the Trips Amendment of
December 6, 2007 which included some flexibilities to facilitate
the use of compulsory licenses for developing countries to fight
health crisis.
3. The new text includes stricter conditions for the protection of
data protection. Data protection applies to new chemical enti-
ties when its discovery implied "considerable effort". The time
for protection is limited to 5 years. Finally, the new text autho-
rizes the use of the Bolar Exception which will allow filling appli-
cations for market approval for a generic even before the
expiration of the patent, when the application is based on bioe-
quivalence studies.i 95
190. SICE, Trade Policy and Development, http://sice.oas.org/TPD/ANDUSA/
COLUSAe.ASP (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
191. Id.
192. Sergio Gomez Maceri, Aun no estan los votos para TLC de Colombia, EL






ment-s.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
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Undoubtedly, these modifications will lessen the negative impact of the
Agreement on access to medicine for the Colombian population.
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